Nigeria’s unresolved nationhood debate is not only a memory from colonial rule. It remains visible in arguments over security, belonging, land, revenue, state creation, restructuring, resource control, and the balance of power between Abuja and the states.
In recent years, insecurity across different parts of the country has returned national attention to one of Nigeria’s oldest constitutional questions, whether a large and diverse federation can be effectively secured through a heavily centralised police structure. The question became even sharper after President Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared a nationwide security emergency on 26 November 2025 and ordered additional recruitment into the police and armed forces. The State House said the police would recruit 20,000 more officers, bringing the planned recruitment figure to 50,000.
That announcement did not create state police. It strengthened an old debate. If insecurity is often local, involving communities, forests, farms, highways, villages, and state boundaries, many Nigerians continue to ask whether governors should have more direct control over policing within their states.
The deeper issue is older than the present administration. On 1 January 1914, following the recommendations of Sir Frederick Lugard, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under one governor general. The act created a single colonial state, but it did not create a negotiated national compact among the many peoples placed inside that state.
This distinction matters. Nigeria was not created out of empty land. Before British rule, the territory contained kingdoms, emirates, city states, trading communities, decentralised societies, religious networks, and many local systems of authority. British colonial rule did not invent these peoples, but it rearranged their political relationships under one imposed authority.
The 1914 Amalgamation and the Uneven Colonial State
The 1914 amalgamation remains one of the most important starting points for understanding modern Nigeria. It created the political container within which many later tensions unfolded.
British colonial rule brought together societies with different political traditions, economic systems, religious histories, and administrative experiences. Lagos and parts of the South had deeper contact with coastal trade, missionary education, newspapers, and early nationalist politics. Much of the North was governed through emirate structures under indirect rule, where colonial officials worked through selected traditional authorities.
This produced an uneven colonial state. The British did not build one equal civic nation from the beginning. They governed different areas through different arrangements, often using existing power structures where those structures suited colonial control. That system helped Britain govern more cheaply, but it also left behind different regional experiences of authority, education, citizenship, and political mobilisation.
Federalism, Regions, and the Politics of Identity
Nigeria’s movement toward federalism came through late colonial constitutional development. Federalism recognised that Nigeria was too diverse to be governed as though it were culturally or politically uniform. But the regional system also hardened political competition around large blocs.
By the time Nigeria approached independence, the North, West, and East had become more than administrative regions. They were political arenas tied to identity, population, party power, and access to the centre. Regional federalism gave different parts of the country a measure of self government, but it also made the struggle for national power more intense.
Nigeria became independent on 1 October 1960. A new constitution established a federal system with an elected prime minister and a ceremonial head of state. Nigeria therefore entered independence as a federation, not as a simple unitary state.
The challenge was that federalism did not remove suspicion between regions. Minority fears, census disputes, electoral competition, regional inequality, and contest over the centre remained powerful. The First Republic soon faced political instability, military intervention, and eventually civil war. The colonial structure did not single handedly create these crises, but it helped shape the arena in which they developed.
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Military Rule and the Centralisation of Power
After independence, military rule transformed Nigeria’s federal structure. The old regions were weakened, more states were created, and federal power expanded. State creation was often presented as a way to address minority fears and reduce the dominance of the old regions. In some cases, it gave previously marginalised groups greater recognition. In other cases, it created new minorities inside new states.
Military rule also strengthened central control over security and revenue. This was especially important after oil became central to Nigeria’s economy. Instead of regions controlling much of their economic destiny, the federal government became the main collector and distributor of national revenue. This changed the meaning of political power. Control of the centre became more valuable, and states became heavily dependent on federal allocation.
This is why Nigeria’s present structure cannot be explained by colonialism alone. It is a layered system shaped by colonial amalgamation, regional federalism, military decrees, oil revenue centralisation, state creation, and the 1999 constitutional order.
The Constitution and the Question of Policing
One of the clearest examples of centralised power is policing. Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution provides for one Nigeria Police Force and states that no other police force shall be established for the federation or any part of it. This means state police cannot simply be created by governors or state assemblies alone. It requires constitutional alteration.
This constitutional structure explains why state police remains a recurring national debate. In February 2026, President Tinubu urged senators to amend the constitution to accommodate state police. In March 2026, reports said the Senate would work to complete the constitutional amendment process before the end of 2026. These developments show movement in the debate, but they do not mean state police has already become law.
The issue is not merely administrative. It goes to the heart of Nigerian federalism. If governors are called chief security officers of their states, but do not directly control the police, then the country’s security structure remains heavily centralised. Supporters of state police argue that local authorities understand local threats better. Critics worry that state police could be abused by governors, especially in places with weak institutions and intense political rivalry.
Both concerns are serious. But the persistence of the debate shows that Nigeria’s constitutional design has not fully answered the security needs of a large and diverse federation.
Resource Control and the Federation Account
Resource control is another major fault line. Section 162 of the 1999 Constitution establishes the Federation Account and provides for the distribution of revenue among the federal, state, and local governments. It also includes the derivation principle, requiring that not less than 13 per cent of revenue from natural resources be returned to producing areas.
This provision helps explain why oil producing communities continue to demand greater control, compensation, and environmental justice. For many communities in the Niger Delta, the issue is not only revenue. It is also about land, pollution, livelihood, and whether the people who bear the cost of extraction receive a fair share of its benefits.
The colonial economy was built around extraction and administrative convenience. Postcolonial Nigeria inherited that structure, then deepened it through oil dependency and federal revenue centralisation. The result is a country where control of resources is inseparable from arguments over justice, development, and political belonging.
State Creation and the Search for Recognition
The demand for new states remains one of Nigeria’s recurring political arguments. Many groups see state creation as a route to recognition, appointments, federal allocation, local control, and protection from domination by larger groups.
In February 2025, the House of Representatives received proposals for 31 new states. However, the House Committee on Constitutional Amendment later said the proposals did not meet the constitutional requirements for consideration. The deeper point is that the demand for territorial recognition remains alive.
This demand reveals a deeper problem. In Nigeria, territory is tied to power. A state is not just a boundary on a map. It can mean access to federal funds, ministerial slots, senatorial representation, civil service positions, and political visibility. That is why state creation can calm one grievance while creating another. Every new state can give one group recognition and still leave smaller groups feeling excluded inside the new arrangement.
Poverty, Inequality, and Regional Pressure
Nigeria’s nationhood debate is also shaped by inequality. The National Bureau of Statistics reported in the 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index that 63 per cent of people in Nigeria, about 133 million people, were multidimensionally poor. It also reported that 65 per cent of the poor lived in the North, while 35 per cent lived in the South.
These figures remain important because they show how regional inequality continues to affect national stability. Poverty does not automatically produce conflict, but when poverty is combined with insecurity, weak schools, unemployment, displacement, climate pressure, and distrust of government, it can deepen social tension.
The danger is that economic inequality can become political resentment. Communities that feel abandoned by the state may turn to identity, religion, region, or local militias for protection and belonging. That is one reason the Nigerian question cannot be reduced to borders alone. Institutions, development, justice, and accountability matter.
What Colonialism Explains, and What It Does Not
Colonial rule shaped Nigeria’s original state structure, but it does not explain everything. Britain did not directly cause every later crisis of insecurity, corruption, poverty, or separatist agitation. Post independence leaders, military governments, political parties, civil servants, business elites, armed groups, and local power brokers have all shaped the country’s direction.
Colonialism explains part of the framework. It explains why many different peoples were placed inside one state without a negotiated national settlement. It explains why indirect rule produced uneven administrative traditions. It explains why regional identity became politically powerful. But it does not remove responsibility from those who governed Nigeria after 1960.
Postcolonial choices deepened many inherited problems. Military rule centralised power. Oil dependency weakened productive federalism. Corruption damaged public trust. Electoral manipulation weakened legitimacy. Poor planning failed many communities. Insecurity grew partly because state authority became absent or ineffective in many local areas.
The strongest historical reading is therefore balanced. Nigeria’s colonial borders and administrative arrangements shaped the foundation on which later crises were built, while post independence decisions determined how deeply those crises entered the life of the country.
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The Four Questions Nigeria Still Has Not Answered
Nigeria’s unresolved nationhood debate continues because four questions remain unsettled.
The first is, who belongs? In many places, citizenship is still filtered through ethnicity, state of origin, indigeneity, religion, ancestry, and local identity. This affects jobs, scholarships, land, political office, and community rights.
The second is, who controls security? Nigeria’s police structure remains federal, even though many security threats are local. This creates frustration when communities expect governors to act quickly, but governors do not fully control the security institutions needed to respond.
The third is, who controls resources? Oil producing communities, agricultural regions, mining communities, and state governments continue to debate how national wealth should be collected and shared.
The fourth is, how should power be shared fairly? State creation, zoning, federal character, restructuring, and constitutional reform are all attempts to answer this question.
Until these questions are addressed with honesty, Nigeria’s colonial borders will remain more than lines drawn by empire. They will continue to influence the living politics of identity, territory, revenue, security, and power.
Conclusion
Nigeria’s challenge is not that its peoples cannot live together. The deeper problem is that the institutions binding them together have repeatedly struggled to create fairness, trust, security, and a shared sense of belonging.
The 1914 amalgamation created one colonial state without a negotiated nationhood settlement. Indirect rule preserved and reshaped local authority unevenly. Regional federalism recognised diversity, but also hardened competition. Military rule centralised power while multiplying states. The 1999 constitutional order retained a strong centre in a country whose conflicts are often intensely local.
Nigeria’s future will not be secured by blaming colonialism alone, nor by pretending the colonial past no longer matters. The task is to reform the structures that keep old tensions alive, especially in policing, resource control, citizenship, representation, and local governance.
Author’s Note
Nigeria’s story is not simply the story of a country forced together by empire. It is the story of a people still negotiating how to live fairly within a state shaped by colonial rule, regional rivalry, military centralisation, oil wealth, and unequal development. The lesson is not that Nigeria is impossible, but that unity cannot survive on slogans alone. A country as diverse as Nigeria needs institutions that protect belonging, share power honestly, secure communities effectively, and make every region feel that the federation is not a burden imposed from above, but a common project worth defending.
References
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Section 214.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Section 162.
The State House, Abuja, “President Tinubu Declares a Security Emergency, Orders Army, Police to Recruit More Personnel.”
Reuters, “Nigeria’s Tinubu Declares Security Emergency, Orders Mass Recruitment of Police and Army.”
Associated Press, “Nigeria’s President Declares Emergency and Beefs Up Forces Following Abductions.”
National Bureau of Statistics, “Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index, 2022.”
TheCable, “Senate, Constitutional Amendment for State Police Will Be Concluded Before End of 2026.”
TheCable, “Amend Constitution to Accommodate State Police, Tinubu Tells Senators.”
Channels Television, “House of Reps Committee Rejects 31 States Creation Proposal.”
Arise News, “We Received 31 Proposals for State Creation, House of Reps Clarifies.”
