Awolowo and Biafra remain inseparable in Nigeria’s public memory of the Civil War. More than half a century after the conflict, the name of Chief Obafemi Awolowo is still invoked in arguments over the federal blockade, the 1968 currency change, starvation in the Biafran enclave and the controversial £20 payment made to many people who surrendered Biafran or old Nigerian currency after the war.
Awolowo occupied a powerful position in General Yakubu Gowon’s wartime administration. He served as Federal Commissioner for Finance and vice-chairman of the Federal Executive Council, giving him major responsibility for economic and financial policy at a time when Nigeria was fighting to defeat the secessionist Republic of Biafra.
A widely circulated transcript attributed to a 1983 town hall interview in Abeokuta presents Awolowo’s retrospective defence of his wartime conduct. In it, he rejected accusations that he was an enemy of the Igbo, defended the currency change, explained his position on food supplies and discussed the postwar treatment of money and bank accounts.
The controversies surrounding his role form part of the wider history of how the Nigerian Federal Government used military, political and economic measures during the 1967 to 1970 conflict.
From Political Crisis to Civil War
Nigeria entered a profound national crisis in 1966. The military coup of January was followed by a counter-coup in July and widespread violence against Eastern Nigerians, particularly Igbo people, in northern Nigeria.
Large numbers of Easterners fled back to the Eastern Region. Relations between the Federal Military Government, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, and the Eastern Region, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, deteriorated despite attempts at political settlement.
On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu proclaimed the Eastern Region an independent state called the Republic of Biafra.
A United States government memorandum dated 31 May recorded that Gowon responded by describing the secession as an act of rebellion, reimposing the economic blockade of the East and ordering federal military mobilisation.
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Open warfare began in July 1967.
The Federal Government fought to preserve Nigeria’s territorial integrity. Biafra’s leaders maintained that secession had become necessary because the Nigerian state could no longer guarantee the safety of Easterners following the violence of 1966.
The struggle was fought not only with soldiers and weapons. Money, access to ports, foreign exchange, trade, food supplies and transport routes became part of the conflict.
Awolowo and Biafra: The Currency Strategy
One of the clearest examples of economic warfare was Nigeria’s decision to replace its existing banknotes in 1968.
The Central Bank of Nigeria describes the measure as a wartime strategy. During the Civil War, Nigeria changed the notes introduced in 1965 in order to prevent their continued use in circumstances that could benefit the secessionist territory.
The consequences for Biafra were considerable.
A breakaway government attempting to purchase weapons and essential supplies abroad needed access to usable money and foreign exchange. Nigerian notes held within Biafran territory were therefore an important economic asset.
Replacing the notes made those holdings far more difficult to use.
Awolowo later defended the policy as an attempt to prevent the secessionist government from using Nigerian currency to finance the war. The currency change formed part of the Federal Government’s broader effort to isolate Biafra financially and reduce its capacity to sustain military resistance.
A 2025 study by Jennifer Confidence, Matthias Nnadi and Karen McBride describes the Nigerian measures as financial currency warfare. The authors argue that the currency strategy helped shorten the conflict while increasing its severity for Biafra through restricted finance, difficulties obtaining foreign currency, shortages and other forms of economic pressure.
The currency change was therefore far more than an ordinary monetary reform. It was a strategic measure taken during war.
The £20 Policy and What Happened to Money After the War
Few issues connected with the Nigerian Civil War have generated more lasting bitterness than the £20 payment.
The Supreme Court case Chief J. J. Enwezor v Central Bank of Nigeria, decided on 19 March 1976, recorded the circumstances surrounding one such payment.
Enwezor, an Onitsha resident, deposited £26,659 in old Nigerian currency with the Central Bank on 7 April 1970. He later sought the equivalent value in the new Nigerian currency.
A letter from the Central Bank, reproduced during the proceedings, informed his solicitor that his entitlement as a depositor was a £20 ex-gratia award authorised by the Federal Government.
Testimony before the court also stated that the Federal Government had directed an ex-gratia payment of £20 after deposits of Biafran currency and old Nigerian currency were collected in the East-Central State.
The Supreme Court rejected Enwezor’s claim to receive the full £26,659 as converted new currency.
The £20 arrangement became one of the most controversial financial measures associated with the immediate postwar period.
However, the payment must be distinguished from the treatment of every bank account that existed in the former Eastern Region before secession.
Prewar Bank Accounts Were Governed Separately
The Banking Obligations (Eastern States) Decree No. 56 of 1970 established rules governing banking obligations connected with the former Eastern States.
Under its provisions, some deposit accounts that existed on 30 May 1967 and had not subsequently been operated during the period of secession could be honoured at par.
Other accounts were treated differently depending on their transaction history and the provisions of the decree.
This distinction is crucial.
The familiar statement that every wealthy person in the former Biafran territory simply lost an entire prewar bank balance and received £20 in its place does not describe the full legal arrangement.
The £20 ex-gratia payment concerned surrendered currency and depositors affected by the currency measures. The Banking Obligations Decree dealt separately with commercial banking liabilities and qualifying account balances.
The decree also addressed residual banking funds after recognised obligations had been taken into account. Those funds were to be transferred through the Central Bank for the account of the Federal Government and applied to postwar reconstruction.
For people emerging from a devastating war, however, these legal distinctions did not remove the economic hardship.
Businesses had collapsed. Property had been damaged or lost. Financial records had disappeared. Currency had become unusable. Banking relationships had been interrupted, and many families were attempting to rebuild their lives with drastically reduced resources.
The economic consequences of the postwar settlement were therefore severe for many people, although not every financial asset was treated in exactly the same way.
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Starvation and the Humanitarian Catastrophe
The most emotionally charged issue surrounding Awolowo and Biafra concerns starvation.
By 1968, the shrinking Biafran enclave contained enormous numbers of civilians and displaced people. Federal advances had reduced the territory available to Biafra and disrupted access to agricultural land, trade and conventional import routes.
The humanitarian consequences were catastrophic.
International Committee of the Red Cross reports from the period described serious famine conditions, widespread malnutrition and kwashiorkor. Reports from 1968 referred to severe hunger among civilians and large numbers of deaths, particularly among displaced populations and people living in refugee camps.
Images of severely malnourished Biafran children became some of the most recognisable photographs of the conflict and helped reshape international humanitarian responses to modern warfare.
The famine had several interconnected causes. Federal blockade and economic pressure were major factors, but territorial losses, mass displacement, disruption of agriculture, wartime destruction, inadequate transport and disputes over humanitarian access also contributed.
A central problem was how food could reach civilians without either side believing that humanitarian assistance was strengthening the enemy’s military position.
The Controversial “Weapon of War” Statement
Awolowo’s name became closely associated with one of the most controversial statements of the war.
During a debate in the British House of Commons on 10 July 1969, Scottish MP Winifred Ewing referred to a copy of Nigeria’s Daily Times dated 26 June.
She told Parliament that the newspaper had reported Awolowo as being opposed to relief materials reaching the rebels and quoted the statement:
“All is fair in war and starvation is one of the weapons of war.”
The quotation was therefore already being publicly attributed to Awolowo during the war itself and was being discussed in the British Parliament in July 1969.
The same parliamentary debate showed how fiercely contested the humanitarian issue had become. British ministers referred to Gowon’s position that starvation should not be used as a legitimate weapon and discussed federal willingness to allow relief under specified conditions.
The dispute was not simply about whether food should reach civilians. It also concerned routes, inspections, flight schedules and the military risks associated with relief operations.
Why Relief Became Part of the War
International relief organisations faced an extraordinary problem.
Biafra required enormous quantities of food and medicine, but its remaining connections with the outside world were also vital to its military survival.
Night flights became especially controversial because humanitarian aircraft and aircraft carrying military supplies could use overlapping routes and facilities.
Federal authorities feared that relief operations could provide cover for arms shipments. They increasingly preferred inspected daylight flights or controlled surface routes.
Biafran leaders had their own security concerns. Daylight flights could expose airfields to attack. Opening defensive lines for surface corridors could also create military vulnerabilities.
American diplomatic reports described continuing obstruction, disagreement and distrust on both sides.
One United States assessment in 1969 stated that both sides had obstructed relief arrangements, while also arguing that Biafran decisions were then creating greater difficulties for certain proposals. Other reports described arguments over daylight flights, river corridors, inspections and overland routes.
Humanitarian relief became entangled with military strategy.
Both governments placed security and wartime considerations ahead of humanitarian priorities at different stages of the conflict.
The Federal Government nevertheless possessed the greater military and economic power and was deliberately attempting to prevent Biafra from obtaining the resources necessary to sustain its war effort.
Awolowo Was Powerful, but He Was Not the Federal Government
The continuing focus on Awolowo sometimes obscures the structure of wartime authority.
He was one of the most influential civilians in Gowon’s administration, particularly on financial and economic matters. His position makes him central to any serious discussion of federal economic policy during the war.
Nigeria, however, was governed by a military regime.
Gowon was Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander. Military commanders, members of the Federal Executive Council, government ministries, civil servants, Central Bank officials and other institutions participated in the development and implementation of wartime policies.
Reducing the entire federal strategy to the actions of one politician oversimplifies how the Nigerian state operated during the conflict.
At the same time, Awolowo was not a detached observer. His offices placed him near the centre of federal economic decision-making, and he defended measures intended to weaken Biafra’s ability to continue fighting.
Economic Warfare and Civilian Consequences
The distinction between attacking an enemy’s military capacity and harming its civilian population becomes especially difficult when food, money and trade become instruments of pressure.
The Federal Government sought to defeat Biafran forces and prevent the secessionist state from obtaining weapons, money and supplies.
By 1968 and 1969, however, widespread civilian malnutrition had become internationally known.
Policies restricting economic activity, access to money and supply routes therefore operated in an environment where millions of civilians were already vulnerable.
The 1968 currency change helped isolate Biafra financially. The blockade restricted trade and access to supplies. Disputes over relief routes limited the quantities of humanitarian aid that could reach the enclave.
These measures had military purposes, but they also affected civilians living inside the war zone.
Modern international humanitarian law prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The law governing armed conflict developed significantly after the Nigerian Civil War, particularly through the 1977 Additional Protocols and the later development of customary humanitarian law.
The Biafran humanitarian disaster itself became an important part of the broader international history of civilian relief during war.
Conclusion
The history of Awolowo and Biafra is more complicated than the political slogans that have surrounded it for decades.
Nigeria deliberately used economic measures against the secessionist state. The 1968 currency change weakened Biafra’s financial position. The federal blockade placed immense pressure on the shrinking territory. Famine and severe malnutrition affected large numbers of civilians.
The £20 ex-gratia payment after the war became another deeply controversial part of the postwar settlement.
At the same time, the £20 payment should not be treated as identical to the legal treatment of every prewar commercial bank account. The Banking Obligations (Eastern States) Decree created a separate system under which some qualifying pre-secession balances could be honoured at par while other obligations were treated differently.
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Awolowo played an important role because he occupied one of the most powerful civilian positions in the wartime Federal Government and was central to financial policy. He was not, however, the sole author of Nigeria’s war strategy.
The Nigerian Civil War was prosecuted by a military government supported by financial, administrative and military institutions.
Its enduring lesson is that economic warfare cannot easily be separated from its human consequences. Measures designed to weaken an enemy government and its armed forces can also transform the lives of civilians who have little control over the decisions that produced the conflict.
Author’s Note
The controversies surrounding Obafemi Awolowo and the Nigerian Civil War show how closely military strategy, financial policy and civilian suffering became intertwined between 1967 and 1970. The currency change, blockade, £20 payment and disputes over humanitarian relief formed part of a wider struggle in which the Federal Government sought to defeat Biafra while millions of civilians endured the consequences of territorial loss, hunger, displacement and economic collapse. Understanding this history requires recognising both the responsibilities of influential policymakers and the larger institutions through which wartime decisions were made. Above all, the experience of Biafra remains a powerful reminder that economic decisions taken during war can leave consequences that continue long after the fighting ends.
References
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Banking Obligations (Eastern States) Decree 1970, Decree No. 56. Supplement to the Federal Official Gazette, Vol. 57, No. 70, 31 December 1970.
Supreme Court of Nigeria. Chief J. J. Enwezor v Central Bank of Nigeria, SC.167/1974, judgment delivered 19 March 1976.
Central Bank of Nigeria. History of Nigerian Currency and records concerning the 1968 currency issue.
UK Parliament, Hansard. House of Commons Debate, “Nigeria”, 10 July 1969, Vol. 786.
International Committee of the Red Cross. Reports on humanitarian operations, famine and war victims in Nigeria and Biafra, 1968.
United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, including documents concerning the Nigerian crisis and blockade.
United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, documents concerning Biafran relief operations, daylight flights and surface corridors.
Confidence, Jennifer; Nnadi, Matthias; and McBride, Karen. “The Impact of Financial Currency Warfare in Civil War Duration and Severity: The Case of the Nigerian-Biafran War.” Accounting History, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2025.
TheNEWS Nigeria. “Flashback on Civil War: Awolowo Defends Himself Against Genocide Accusation”, 11 July 2019.
