Nigeria’s First Republic (1960–1966) was born out of a colonial federation designed more for administrative convenience than national integration. The new nation adopted a Westminster parliamentary system with a federal structure composed of three regions: Northern, Western, and Eastern, each with its own premier and legislature. Political competition largely followed regional lines.
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The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) dominated the North under Sir Ahmadu Bello; the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, was most influential in the East; and the Action Group (AG) under Chief Obafemi Awolowo controlled the West. Though described as “national” parties, each drew support mainly from its ethnic heartland. This pattern, rooted in colonial administrative divisions and the politics of indirect rule, created a federation of uneasy partners rather than a unified polity (Dudley, 1973; Falola & Heaton, 2008).
Economic and educational inequalities further strained relations. The North’s late entry into Western education limited its representation in the federal civil service and armed forces, heightening suspicions of Southern domination. The First Republic thus inherited fragile institutions and deep-seated regional mistrust.
Political Breakdown and the Western Crisis
The Western Region crisis of the early 1960s epitomised the Republic’s fragility. A rift developed between Premier Chief Awolowo and his deputy Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, leading to the AG’s split in 1962. The ensuing political unrest prompted the federal government to declare a state of emergency, effectively suspending the region’s self-government. Awolowo was later charged and imprisoned for treasonable felony, a case widely viewed by historians as politically motivated (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
The situation worsened during the 1964 federal elections and the 1965 Western Regional elections, both marred by intimidation, ballot manipulation, and violence. In the West, the post-election unrest known as “Operation Wetie” saw widespread arson and killings. By late 1965, much of the Western Region was in chaos, and the credibility of civilian politics had collapsed. Many young officers in the Nigerian Army, witnessing these developments, began to see military intervention as the only means to restore order (Siollun, 2009).
The January 1966 Coup: Planning and Execution
In the early hours of 15 January 1966, a group of mainly middle-ranking army officers launched a coordinated coup d’état. The principal organiser was Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, who led operations in Kaduna, while others struck in Lagos, Ibadan, and Enugu. Their declared objective was to eliminate corrupt politicians and “restructure” the political system.
The coup succeeded in some areas but failed to achieve nationwide control. In Lagos, Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, managed to rally loyal troops and contain the rebellion. Key political and military figures were killed, including Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, and Samuel Akintola. The Governor-General, Dr Azikiwe, was abroad at the time (Dudley, 1973; Siollun, 2009).
While the coup leaders portrayed their actions as a patriotic purge, their ethnic composition and casualty pattern, with most victims being Northern and Western leaders, fuelled Northern suspicions of Igbo dominance.
The Ironsi Regime and the Unification Decree
Following the coup, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi assumed control as Head of State on 16 January 1966. He suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and established the Supreme Military Council. Initially, some Nigerians welcomed the army’s promise of reform and national unity. However, the new government’s actions soon deepened regional resentment.
In May 1966, Ironsi promulgated Decree No. 34, which replaced the federal system with a unitary structure. Although intended to streamline administration and reduce regional friction, many Northerners interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to impose Southern, particularly Igbo, dominance. Northern officers, already aggrieved by the January killings, viewed the decree as confirmation of their fears (Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette, 1966).
The Ironsi government’s slow response to these tensions and its failure to discipline the January coup plotters further undermined its credibility in the North.
The July 1966 Counter-Coup and Escalating Ethnic Violence
On 29 July 1966, Northern officers staged a counter-coup, assassinating Major-General Ironsi and his host, Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, in Ibadan. The mutineers installed Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon as Head of State. The coup was followed by mass anti-Igbo violence across several Northern cities, leading to the deaths of thousands of Igbo civilians and the flight of many to the Eastern Region.
By late 1966, Nigeria’s fragile unity had disintegrated. Mutual mistrust paralysed the military and civil administration. Efforts to negotiate a new political framework, such as the Aburi Conference of January 1967, failed to resolve the crisis. In May 1967, Gowon announced the creation of twelve states, partly to dilute regional power blocs and reassure minorities. The Eastern Region, under Lt-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, rejected the move and declared the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967, setting the stage for the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Siollun, 2009).
Economic and Social Consequences
The twin coups and subsequent violence severely disrupted Nigeria’s economy. Trade networks collapsed, agricultural output declined, and internal migration surged as displaced persons fled sectarian attacks. The departure of Igbo traders and professionals from the North had lasting commercial and social consequences, deepening regional economic disparities (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
Urban insecurity and military suspicion created a climate of fear. Civilian governance was replaced by decrees, and the military soon became entrenched in political life, setting a precedent for future interventions.
Legacy
The January and July 1966 coups marked a turning point in Nigeria’s political history. They ended the First Republic and inaugurated decades of military rule. The coups institutionalised ethno-regional suspicion and normalised the army’s role as arbiter in political disputes.
Historians highlight several enduring lessons:
- The dangers of weak institutions and manipulated elections;
- The fragility of federal balance in ethnically diverse societies, and
- The challenge of building national loyalty over regional identity (Dudley, 1973; Siollun, 2009).
The 1966 crisis demonstrated that independence alone could not guarantee stability without credible governance, equitable development, and trust in political processes.
The 1966 Nigerian coup d’état was not merely a military plot it was the culmination of political failure, regional rivalry, and institutional weakness. The coup’s aftermath exposed deep fractures within the federation and inaugurated a cycle of military intervention that shaped Nigeria’s politics for decades. The lessons remain urgent: democracy requires not only elections but integrity, accountability, and inclusion.
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Author’s Note
This verified account is based on academic and archival documentation. It separates confirmed historical facts from popular exaggerations and situates the 1966 events within Nigeria’s broader post-independence challenges.
References
Dudley, B. J. Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan University Press, 1973.
Falola, T. & Heaton, M. M. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Siollun, M. Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966–1976). Algora Publishing, 2009.
