Nigeria’s history is marked by a series of military coups, particularly in 1966, 1975, 1983, and 1985. These events reveal that coups were not spontaneous uprisings but carefully orchestrated operations. Success often depended on which military formations were seized first, how elite units were neutralized, and how key command centers were controlled.
Targeting Armoured and Rapid Response Units
In Nigeria, coup plotters consistently prioritised units with heavy firepower and mobility. Armoured brigades, artillery units, and mechanised divisions controlled tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and troop transport assets critical to overpowering loyalist forces.
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During the January 1966 coup, plotters moved swiftly to neutralise these formations in Lagos and Kaduna, ensuring loyalist troops could not effectively mobilise against them. Similarly, in the December 1983 coup that ousted President Shehu Shagari, units capable of rapid deployment were quickly co-opted to secure control over strategic locations.
Neutralising Presidential and Elite Guard Formations
Nigeria’s presidential and state guards were always a major obstacle to coup plotters. In 1966, the assassination of key officers and the neutralization of elite units around the presidency in Lagos was a decisive factor in the coup’s initial success. These units were designed to protect the head of state, so controlling or neutralising them was essential to isolate political leadership.
Controlling Command and Communication Centres
Headquarters, barracks, and communications hubs have been targeted in almost every Nigerian coup. In 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida’s coup against General Muhammadu Buhari was facilitated by securing army command centers and communication points, preventing loyalist forces from coordinating a counter-response. Control over these centers allowed plotters to coordinate troop movements and assert authority across regions efficiently.
Securing Strategic Urban Centres
The capital city, Lagos, and other major urban areas were always critical in Nigerian coups. Key infrastructure airports, bridges, highways, and government offices was seized early to restrict the movement of loyalist troops. This ensured that coup leaders could consolidate power without significant resistance and maintain control over critical political and economic hubs.
Leveraging Insider Knowledge
Nigerian coup plotters frequently emerged from within the military, using knowledge of officer loyalties and unit hierarchies to identify which formations could be persuaded or neutralised. In the 1966 and 1983 coups, plotters exploited personal networks to secure the cooperation of sympathetic units, reducing the need for direct combat and avoiding unnecessary casualties.
Preventing Fragmentation and Resistance
Rapid action in Nigeria’s coups limited the ability of loyalist factions to organize resistance. The January 1966 coup moved quickly against critical formations, leaving minimal time for counteraction. Similarly, the December 1983 coup neutralized potential opposition in Lagos and Kaduna within hours, demonstrating the importance of speed and coordination in maintaining military cohesion and avoiding fragmentation.
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Establishing Institutional Control
Control over key formations allowed coup leaders to claim authority as representatives of the military institution, rather than rogue factions. In Nigeria, this strategy was evident in 1985 when Babangida secured major army and air force units before declaring the removal of Buhari. Such institutional control gave legitimacy to the coup and allowed the new leadership to establish governance structures with minimal immediate resistance.
Author’s Note
Nigeria’s coups demonstrate that military takeovers were strategic, calculated, and dependent on the control of specific formations. Armoured units, elite guards, command centres, and urban hubs were decisive in determining outcomes. Historical examples from 1966, 1983, and 1985 show that whoever controlled these critical units effectively controlled the state, revealing the methodical nature of Nigerian military coups.
References
Diamond, L. (1988). Classifying and Understanding Military Coups. Journal of Democracy.
Luckham, R. (1971). The Nigerian Military and the Coup d’Etat. Cambridge University Press.
Sklar, R. (2004). Nigerian Political History: Coups and Military Rule. University Press.
