The Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), commonly called the Biafran War, remains one of the most defining and tragic chapters in modern African history. The conflict was rooted in deep political, ethnic, and economic rifts that persisted after independence from Britain in 1960.
Following the military coups of January and July 1966 and the secession of the Eastern Region as the Republic of Biafra under Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Nigeria descended into a brutal civil conflict.
By 1968, the Federal Military Government under General Yakubu Gowon had launched several coordinated offensives to reclaim secessionist territories and restore national unity. Among the most decisive of these campaigns was the southern coastal offensive led by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, the officer who would earn the sobriquet “Black Scorpion.”
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Adekunle’s Command and the Third Marine Commando Division
Colonel Benjamin Adesanya Maja Adekunle (1936–2014) was born in Kaduna to a Yoruba father from Ogbomoso and a Bachama mother from Adamawa. Trained at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, he was commissioned into the Nigerian Army in 1960 and gained early operational experience as part of Nigeria’s United Nations peacekeeping contingent in the Congo.
In July 1967, Adekunle assumed command of the newly created Third Infantry (Composite) Division, which he later restructured and renamed the Third Marine Commando Division (3MCDO). The new designation reflected both its amphibious mission and the complex riverine terrain of the Niger Delta.
Operating across Bonny, Calabar, and Port Harcourt, regions dominated by swamps, tidal creeks, and mangrove forests, the division developed novel tactics suited to the environment. Adekunle’s troops employed small boats, canoes, and local guides to conduct surprise riverine assaults, integrating naval and ground operations in ways unprecedented in Nigerian military history.
Their strategic objective was clear: to secure Nigeria’s coastline, deny Biafra maritime access, and regain control of vital oil installations critical to the national economy.
The Capture of Port Harcourt
Port Harcourt, the industrial and maritime heart of Biafra, was the secessionist state’s principal gateway to international aid and arms. Its loss would mean economic strangulation.
In early 1968, Adekunle’s 3MCDO, supported by the Nigerian Navy, including ships such as NNS Ogoja, NNS Lokoja, and NNS Ibadan, launched a combined amphibious and land assault. The advance moved through Bonny, Okrika, and Elele, culminating in the capture of Port Harcourt between 18 and 20 May 1968.
The fall of the city marked a decisive military and psychological turning point. Biafra was permanently cut off from the Atlantic Ocean, its oil exports halted, and its access to foreign supplies effectively blocked. The Federal Government regained control of the port and nearby oilfields, restoring vital petroleum revenues that strengthened its war effort.
However, the triumph came at a grave human cost. Widespread civilian displacement, urban destruction, and humanitarian crises followed in its wake, consequences that would persist long after the fighting subsided.
Tactics and Operational Innovation
The success of the 3MCDO stemmed from its adaptability. Adekunle and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Godwin Alabi-Isama, devised flexible tactics combining infantry maneuver, naval fire support, and riverine mobility.
Alabi-Isama’s memoir, The Tragedy of Victory (2013), provides a rare first-hand account of these operations, describing how small-boat patrols, surprise crossings, and timed assaults allowed the division to outmaneuver entrenched Biafran forces along the creeks and waterways.
Adekunle’s leadership was both inspirational and exacting. His “Black Scorpion” persona symbolized discipline and relentless offensive spirit. While admired by his troops for courage and innovation, his uncompromising rhetoric and methods also drew criticism for their severity. These qualities reflected the intensity and moral complexities of civil war combat.
Key Officers
Colonel Benjamin Adekunle – Commander, 3MCDO (1967–1969). Led federal operations from Bonny through the capture of Port Harcourt, earning national and international recognition.
Lieutenant Colonel Godwin Alabi-Isama – Chief of Staff and principal strategist; oversaw amphibious logistics and planning. His later writings are primary sources for understanding the Atlantic Theatre.
Lieutenant Colonel Alani Akinrinade – Senior field officer in the division who later rose to Major General and became an influential pro-democracy advocate.
Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo – Succeeded Adekunle as commander of the 3MCDO in May 1969, completing the division’s inland operations leading to Biafra’s final defeat in 1970.
Strategic, Economic, and Social Impact
The fall of Port Harcourt effectively severed Biafra’s maritime lifeline and crippled its war economy. While federal control of the Atlantic seaboard was achieved progressively through subsequent operations, the 3MCDO’s success at Port Harcourt made this outcome inevitable.
The economic implications were immense. By denying Biafra access to oil revenues and import routes, the Federal Government gained a decisive logistical and financial advantage. Scholars such as E. Uche (2008) have observed that British oil interests, particularly Shell-BP’s presence in the Niger Delta, added urgency to federal operations in the region.
Socially, the offensive worsened displacement and infrastructure collapse, yet the 3MCDO stood out as one of the most ethnically integrated formations in the Nigerian Army, drawing soldiers from all regions of the country and forging bonds that endured after the war.
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Legacy and Interpretation
Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s legacy is multifaceted. To supporters, he was a brilliant innovator whose riverine warfare tactics helped end the war. To critics, his rhetoric symbolized the ruthless side of the federal campaign.
Nonetheless, his operations established doctrines for amphibious warfare still studied by the Nigerian military. Officers who served under him, Alabi-Isama, Akinrinade, and Obasanjo, went on to shape Nigeria’s post-war military and political landscape.
The capture of Port Harcourt also set the stage for General Gowon’s post-war “No Victor, No Vanquished” policy, reflecting the government’s effort to reconcile a nation scarred by conflict.
The capture of Port Harcourt in May 1968 by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s Third Marine Commando Division stands as one of the pivotal moments in the Nigerian Civil War. It showcased the adaptability of Nigerian forces to challenging environments and demonstrated the centrality of economic infrastructure, especially oil, to the dynamics of modern warfare.
Author’s Note
Adekunle’s image, often seen in wartime photographs alongside his men, remains emblematic of courage, innovation, and the enduring costs of civil conflict. The 3MCDO’s campaign remains one of the most studied examples of leadership and operational creativity in Nigeria’s military history.
References:
1. Alabi-Isama, Godwin. The Tragedy of Victory: On-the-Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre. Spectrum Books Ltd., 2013.
2. Uche, E. “Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War.” Journal of African Studies, 2008.
3. Obasanjo, Olusegun. My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970. Heinemann, 1980.
4. “The Nature and Impact of the Navy’s Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970).” International Journal of Naval History, Vol. 19, 2022.
5. Madiebo, Alexander A. The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War. Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.
