On 31 December 1983, Nigeria’s military seized power from President Shehu Shagari’s civilian government. The coup, led by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, ended the Second Republic and justified its intervention with accusations of corruption, economic collapse, and electoral malpractice.
EXPLORE NOW: Biographies & Cultural Icons of Nigeria
Immediately after taking control, the military suspended key provisions of the 1979 Constitution, dissolved political parties, and banned open political activity. Nigeria once again came under direct military rule. Buhari assumed the role of Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), while Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon became his Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters. Executive authority now rested in the SMC, which governed by decree rather than parliamentary debate.
Leadership and Institutional Change
Buhari and Idiagbon prioritised discipline, accountability, and national order. They dismantled civilian institutions and appointed senior officers and technocrats to head ministries. Security agencies detained or investigated many officials from the previous civilian government for alleged corruption.
Although some Nigerians welcomed the new regime’s firm stance, others grew uneasy as democratic structures disappeared. Moreover, the restrictions on civic freedoms alarmed journalists, trade unions, and academics. By mid-1984, the regime had consolidated authoritarian control, and decision-making remained concentrated within the military elite.
Economic Context and Policy Response
Buhari’s government inherited a severe fiscal crisis. Oil export revenues, which had fuelled public spending in the 1970s, had dropped sharply after 1981. Consequently, external reserves fell, and Nigeria’s foreign debt rose. Industrial output declined as import restrictions choked access to raw materials.
To stabilise the economy, the regime imposed austerity. It tightened foreign-exchange controls, restricted luxury imports, and prioritised debt repayment. Public expenditure fell drastically, and thousands of civil servants lost their jobs. These measures aimed to restore financial discipline; however, they worsened inflation, unemployment, and commodity shortages.
Scholars describe this as an attempt at internal economic adjustment without relying on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nigeria’s rejection of IMF loan conditions earned some nationalist approval, yet the policy failed to revive growth. Moreover, the regime’s closed-market strategy limited access to vital inputs and deepened the recession.
The War Against Indiscipline (WAI)
In March 1984, the government launched the War Against Indiscipline (WAI), a civic campaign to promote ethical conduct and order. Citizens were urged to queue properly, keep their surroundings clean, and report corruption. Military officers and WAI brigades monitored compliance through patrols and inspections.
Initially, the campaign improved punctuality and public hygiene, particularly in cities. However, enforcement soon became coercive. Reports of humiliation, arbitrary punishment, and excessive force appeared in the press. Furthermore, Decree No. 4 of 1984 curtailed press freedom by criminalising publications that embarrassed public officials.
Although the WAI promoted discipline, it also revealed the regime’s authoritarian impulse. It emphasised obedience over civil rights and relied on intimidation rather than persuasion.
Repression, the Law and the Press
The Buhari regime ruled primarily by decree, bypassing judicial review. Under Decree No. 2, security forces detained individuals without trial, including journalists who criticised government policy. Special anti-corruption tribunals sentenced many Second Republic politicians to long prison terms.
Public opinion remained divided. Some citizens praised the trials as proof of accountability, while others condemned them as selective justice. Meanwhile, human-rights groups and foreign observers criticised the lack of due process. Trade unions, civil-society groups, and the press operated under intimidation, creating a pervasive climate of fear.
Internal Military Dissent and the 1985 Takeover
By 1985, discontent had spread through the armed forces. Younger officers opposed the government’s rigidity, isolationism, and prolonged detentions. The absence of consultation within the Supreme Military Council deepened internal rifts.
On 27 August 1985, Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida staged a palace coup that removed Buhari from power. The takeover was bloodless and portrayed as an attempt to “humanise” governance. Babangida replaced the SMC with the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and pledged a more pragmatic economic policy and improved foreign relations.
Consequently, Nigeria entered another phase of military rule—one that promised reform but continued to sideline democracy.
Legacy
The Buhari–Idiagbon interregnum (1983–1985) remains one of Nigeria’s most contested periods. Supporters remember it as a time of moral revival and administrative integrity. Critics, however, highlight its economic hardship, human-rights abuses, and intolerance of dissent.
Ultimately, the experience reinforced a recurring pattern in Nigeria’s history: military regimes often justify coups as solutions to civilian failings but rarely resolve the systemic problems they inherit. Buhari’s rule demonstrated that authoritarian discipline could not replace institutional reform or transparent governance.
Therefore, his brief government left a dual legacy—one of enforced order and nationalistic austerity, but also of repression and fragility.
Author’s Note
The December 1983 coup replaced a failing civilian order with a military regime that pursued austerity and moral discipline. The administration achieved short-term control but deepened economic pain and curtailed civil liberties. Its fall in August 1985 revealed the inherent instability of rule by decree and the limits of coercive reform in addressing systemic economic problems.
READ MORE: Ancient & Pre-Colonial Nigeria
References
Olukoshi, Adebayo O. “Crisis Management under the Buhari Administration.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 48 (1990), pp. 34–47.
Falola, Toyin, and Matthew Heaton. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
