When Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi became Head of State in January 1966, Nigeria was responding to a crisis that had overwhelmed civilian government. The coup of 15 January brought the killings of senior political leaders and top military officers, and the First Republic quickly lost the ability to govern effectively. The armed forces stepped in claiming the need to restore order and prevent further national breakdown.
This moment marked more than a change of leadership. It introduced a different grammar of power. The new federal military government did not govern through parliament or party negotiation. It governed through command, backed by law made through decrees signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government.
Decree rule, and what it meant for the constitution
Under the new order, constitutional authority shifted sharply. Early military decrees, especially Decree No. 1 of 1966, established that governing power would be exercised by decree. Where a decree conflicted with earlier constitutional arrangements, the decree took precedence.
Some institutions continued to operate. Courts remained open, and the civil service continued daily administration. However, their authority existed within limits defined by military rule. Executive and legislative powers were no longer separate. They were concentrated in the Head of State and the governing military council. This fusion of powers created Nigeria’s first experience of rule by decree and shaped how citizens understood the state, powerful, decisive, and no longer dependent on electoral legitimacy.
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Legitimacy, fear, and the search for reassurance
Under civilian rule, legitimacy came from elections, parliamentary responsibility, and constitutional procedure. Under military rule, legitimacy was presented as necessity, the argument that only the armed forces could stabilise the country.
After January 1966, Nigerians judged the government not only by its actions, but by what those actions appeared to signal. In a society already shaken by violence, every decision was read through regional and ethnic experience. People looked for reassurance that the state would act fairly, punish violence, and protect all parts of the federation from domination.
Decree No. 34 and why May 1966 became a turning point
On 24 May 1966, the government promulgated Decree No. 34, commonly known as the Unification Decree. The decree altered Nigeria’s federal structure by replacing the regional system with a unitary administrative framework. Regions were converted into provinces under central authority.
Supporters believed unification could reduce destructive regional rivalry and strengthen national administration. Critics viewed it as the removal of federal safeguards that regions relied upon for security, especially in the tense aftermath of the January coup. The decree did not abolish political parties or elections. Those had already been displaced by military takeover. Its importance lay in restructuring power between the centre and the former regions.
In a climate of fear and uncertainty, the unification policy was not received as a neutral administrative reform. It was interpreted as a decisive shift in the balance of power at the very moment when trust in the state was weakest.
The unresolved question of justice, what happened to the coup plotters
Nothing damaged confidence in the new government more than the unresolved handling of the January coup plotters. Archival records from the Nigerian Police Special Branch confirm that those involved in the coup were arrested and detained after its failure. By July 1966, however, none had been brought to a completed court martial process.
This absence of visible legal resolution became politically explosive. In the North, where many of the January victims were prominent leaders and officers, delayed accountability was widely seen as selective justice. In the absence of clear conclusions, suspicion flourished. Rumour filled the space where legal process was expected.
The issue was not only punishment. It was reassurance. Without a completed and public process, many Nigerians felt the state had failed to demonstrate impartial authority at a critical moment.
Nzeogwu, detention, and the danger of exaggeration
One figure frequently drawn into these debates is Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The established record shows that he was arrested and detained after the coup failed. Claims that he was released or formally protected during Ironsi’s time in power do not belong to the January to July 1966 period. His later movement and release occurred under different circumstances during the civil war period and should not be folded into the immediate aftermath of Ironsi’s rule.
Keeping this distinction clear matters, because exaggeration around individual cases often obscures the broader reality. The central problem was not special treatment for one officer, but the failure to conclude a visible accountability process before the government itself fell.
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Why July came, and why this period still matters
By mid 1966, two developments had fused in public perception, rapid centralisation through Decree No. 34 and unresolved justice for the January coup. Together, they undermined confidence that the military government was acting as a neutral national authority.
As trust eroded, discipline within the armed forces weakened. Grievances hardened into resentment, and resentment created space for retaliation. The July 1966 counter coup, which resulted in the killing of Ironsi, emerged from accumulated fear and unresolved trauma rather than a single decision or decree.
January to July 1966 remains a defining chapter in Nigeria’s political history because it shows how power exercised without reassurance can deepen division. In moments of national shock, procedure is not decoration. It is a signal of fairness, and without it, authority becomes fragile.
Author’s Note
Nigeria’s first months under military rule show that control can be seized quickly, yet legitimacy is harder to hold. Decrees can reshape institutions overnight, but they cannot replace confidence. When accountability is delayed in a traumatised society, people create their own explanations, then act on them, and the cost is often measured in lives.
References
E. A. Keay, “Legal and Constitutional Changes in Nigeria Under the Military Government”, Journal of African Law, 1966.
I. A. Ayua and D. A. Dakas, “Federal Republic of Nigeria”, Global Dialogue on Federalism, Forum of Federations.
Nigerian Police Special Branch, “Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966”, official investigation report excerpts.
Text of Decree No. 34 of 1966, Unification Decree, 24 May 1966.
Text of Decree No. 1 of 1966, constitutional authority decree.
