Nigeria’s experiment with electoral and parliamentary democracy after independence in 1960 began with optimism but quickly descended into crisis. The new federation inherited deep regional, ethnic, and institutional divisions from colonial rule. Between 1959 and 1965, flawed elections, administrative bias, and violent political rivalries steadily eroded public confidence in the ballot box.
These developments undermined both the legitimacy and the stability of the First Republic, setting the stage for the military coup of January 15, 1966. While electoral malpractice was not the only cause of the Republic’s collapse, it symbolised the fragility of Nigeria’s early democratic institutions.
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Parties and the Colonial Electoral Legacy
By the late 1950s, Nigeria’s political landscape was dominated by three regionally based parties:
- The Northern People’s Congress (NPC)- controlling the vast Northern Region.
- The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)- rooted in the Eastern Region.
- The Action Group (AG)- dominant in the Western Region.
Each party was closely tied to its region’s ethnic and cultural identity: Hausa-Fulani for the NPC, Igbo for the NCNC, and Yoruba for the AG. Rather than fostering national integration, these parties deepened regional loyalties.
Electoral administration during this period was handled first by the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) (established in 1958) and later by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) after independence. Both were constitutionally recognised but lacked financial autonomy, clear legal authority, and protection from political influence. Their structural weakness made them vulnerable to manipulation by ruling elites.
The 1959 Federal Election: Structural Advantage and Political Reality
Nigeria’s first nationwide election on 12 December 1959 was held under British supervision to determine who would lead the country into independence. Of the 312 seats in the House of Representatives, results were as follows:
- NPC -134 seats,
- NCNC–NEPU alliance -89 seats,
- Action Group -75 seats,
with a handful of minor-party and independent candidates winning the rest.
Because constituency boundaries were drawn largely using the 1952–53 colonial census, the North, already the most populous region, enjoyed a structural advantage in representation. Many constituencies in the North were uncontested due to NPC dominance.
While some Nigerians suspected the British colonial authorities of “tilting” the outcome in favour of the North, no conclusive archival evidence supports deliberate rigging. Scholars generally attribute the NPC’s victory to structural and demographic factors, rather than active manipulation.
The election nevertheless entrenched regional power disparities: the North dominated parliament, the East provided the federal president (Nnamdi Azikiwe), and the West became the opposition. This balance was unstable from the start.
The 1964–65 General Elections: Contested Legitimacy
Nigeria’s first post-independence general elections were scheduled for December 1964, with delayed polls in some constituencies into early 1965. The contest pitted two massive coalitions against each other:
- The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), led by the ruling NPC and its allies.
- The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), an opposition alliance of the NCNC, AG, and smaller parties.
The campaign atmosphere was tense and polarised. Reports emerged of intimidation, disqualification of candidates, falsified registers, and arrests of opposition figures. In parts of the North and West, opposition candidates withdrew, alleging that the process was rigged before polling began.
Dozens of seats were declared uncontested, automatically awarding victories to NNA candidates. When results were announced, the opposition denounced the election as fraudulent. President Azikiwe initially refused to invite Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa to form a government, citing widespread irregularities.
A temporary compromise was eventually reached, but the crisis left the government’s legitimacy badly damaged. Many Nigerians began to doubt that peaceful political competition was still possible.
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The Western Region Crisis: When Politics Turned to Violence
The Western Region became the flashpoint of Nigeria’s democratic collapse. A split within the Action Group (AG) in 1962 between its leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and the regional premier, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, fractured the Yoruba political elite. Akintola, expelled from the AG, formed the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and allied with the federal NPC.
In 1963, Awolowo was tried and imprisoned for treason, deepening regional tensions. The Western parliamentary election of October 1965 was widely condemned as fraudulent. Reports of ballot-box stuffing, intimidation, and falsified results were widespread.
Public outrage erupted into “Operation Wetie”, a violent protest movement characterised by arson, lynching, and political assassinations. Whole towns, including Ibadan and Oyo, descended into chaos. The regional police were accused of partisanship, and federal intervention under emergency powers did little to restore order.
The Western crisis symbolised the collapse of Nigeria’s democratic safeguards and made military intervention seem increasingly inevitable.
Institutional Weaknesses Behind Electoral Failure
The roots of Nigeria’s electoral malpractice during the First Republic lay in systemic and institutional deficiencies:
- Weak and politicised electoral bodies:
The ECN and FEC lacked administrative reach, independence, and enforcement capacity. Their officials were often appointed through partisan channels, compromising neutrality. - Inadequate legal framework:
Election laws provided few effective remedies against rigging or intimidation. Courts were slow and reluctant to overturn results, further eroding public trust. - Compromised security institutions:
The police and local security agencies often acted on behalf of ruling parties, enabling suppression of opposition rallies and ballot manipulation.
These flaws were compounded by elite behaviour: for many politicians, winning elections was a zero-sum struggle for access to state patronage, not a contest of ideas or policy.
From Ballot Box to Barracks: The Road to the 1966 Coup
By late 1965, Nigeria’s democratic system was in deep crisis. Elections were widely viewed as meaningless, and public faith in civilian government had collapsed. Violence in the West, boycotts in the East, and rising ethnic suspicion across the North created a combustible political atmosphere.
Although economic grievances, elite rivalries, and ethno-regional tensions also played major roles, the loss of electoral credibility was central to the breakdown of the First Republic. When a group of young army officers struck on 15 January 1966, they justified their coup as an attempt to end corruption and restore national order.
The coup ended Nigeria’s first democratic experiment and ushered in over a decade of military rule.
Legacy and Lessons
The collapse of the First Republic was not inevitable. It was the cumulative product of weak institutions, regional rivalry, and elite manipulation of the electoral process. Yet, it offered important lessons for Nigeria’s later democratic experiments.
Reforms introduced after the civil war, and especially the creation of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 1998, sought to avoid the pitfalls of the 1959–65 period. Modern efforts to improve voter registration, ballot security, and judicial oversight directly reflect the failures of the First Republic.
However, recurring disputes and allegations of malpractice in recent elections show that the foundational problems of trust, partisanship, and institutional fragility have not disappeared. Nigeria’s democratic endurance depends on confronting these historic patterns.
Nigeria’s First Republic fell not simply because of regional rivalries or economic distress but because its electoral system failed to command legitimacy. When the ballot became a tool of exclusion and coercion rather than choice, citizens and soldiers alike lost faith in civilian governance.
Author’s Note
The experience remains a warning: democracy cannot survive without credible elections, independent institutions, and a political culture that values fair competition over domination. The First Republic’s story thus stands as both a tragedy and a lesson, one that continues to echo through Nigeria’s democratic journey.
References:
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), History of Electoral Commissions in Nigeria.
Anglin, D. G. (1965). Brinkmanship in Nigeria: The Federal Elections of 1964–65. Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics.
RSIS International Journal (2023). Institutional Weakness and Electoral Integrity in Nigeria.
IJAAR Journal (2023). Electoral Malpractice and Political Crisis in Nigeria’s First Republic.
Awolowo Treason Trial records and archival press reports (1963).
