Nigeria’s first military coup unfolded in the late hours of January 14 and the early hours of January 15, 1966, as coordinated actions by junior officers aimed at removing the civilian leadership of the First Republic. Although often remembered as a single event, the coup was experienced very differently in three key centres of power, Kaduna in the Northern Region, Lagos as the federal capital, and Ibadan in the Western Region.
What happened in each location followed the same broad intent but produced sharply different outcomes. Kaduna saw the most decisive local action, Ibadan delivered a fatal blow to Western political leadership, and Lagos, the only city capable of producing immediate national authority, never came under stable coup control. These differences shaped the outcome of the coup and the arguments that followed.
The plan and its limits
The coup plot rested on speed and surprise. The intention was to strike political leaders and senior military officers simultaneously, seize key installations, and establish authority before loyal forces could regroup. Violence was meant to open the door to command.
But Nigeria’s authority structure did not rest on force alone. Control required communications, accepted chains of command, and the compliance of military units beyond the capital. Without those, even a violent intervention could stall.
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Kaduna, the Northern Region strike
Kaduna was the most effective theatre in the early hours of the coup. Under the leadership of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, coup forces moved swiftly against the Northern Region’s political and military leadership. The Northern Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was killed at his residence, along with senior officers targeted by the plot.
For several hours, Kaduna functioned under coup control. Movement and information were shaped by the insurgent forces, and news spread through rumours and fragmented reports rather than a clear national broadcast. This created the impression that the coup had succeeded across the country, even though that impression did not reflect the full reality.
The impact of the Kaduna killings extended beyond immediate control. The death of the Northern Region’s most powerful political figure became one of the defining images of the coup and a central reference point in later national debates.
Ibadan, the Western Region intervention
In Ibadan, the coup focused on the Western Region’s leadership. Premier Samuel Ladoke Akintola was killed during the operation. The Western Region at the time was already deeply unstable, marked by political violence, contested elections, and a prolonged crisis that had weakened confidence in civilian rule.
Because of this context, the strike in Ibadan carried heavy political weight. It did not occur in isolation but landed inside an existing conflict, amplifying the sense that the coup was intervening directly in the most volatile regional struggle of the period.
Like Kaduna, Ibadan saw tactical success in removing a key figure. But like Kaduna, that success did not translate into national control.
Lagos, the federal centre that never locked down
Lagos was the decisive arena because Lagos held federal authority. If the coup could not secure Lagos, it could not govern Nigeria. The objective there was to neutralise senior military command, arrest or eliminate top federal leaders, and seize the mechanisms through which authority flowed.
Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was abducted from his residence by coup forces. His death was later confirmed, and his body was found days after the abduction along the Lagos, Ota, Abeokuta corridor. The removal of the Prime Minister marked the coup as a direct assault on the state itself.
Yet Lagos never became the coup’s headquarters. Key senior officers were not all neutralised, control of communications remained fragmented, and no stable chain of command emerged that could issue enforceable orders nationwide. Violence occurred, but authority did not consolidate.
This failure defined the coup’s fate. Without Lagos firmly in hand, the coup could not move from disruption to rule.
The Kaduna broadcast and its meaning
Later on January 15, Major Nzeogwu issued a declaration of martial law from Radio Nigeria, Kaduna. The broadcast condemned corruption and political profiteering and announced military control over the Northern Provinces.
The importance of the broadcast lay not only in its message but in its source. A regional capital was speaking at a moment when the federal capital had not produced a single, uncontested national voice. Kaduna could announce control over the North, but it could not command the federation. The broadcast highlighted both confidence and limitation.
Why power slipped away
By the afternoon and evening of January 15, the central question had shifted. The issue was no longer who struck first, but who held recognised command of the armed forces. Attacks and assassinations had produced shock, but shock did not equal governance.
Senior officers outside the plot were able to regroup, assess the situation, and assert control. The absence of a unified coup command allowed authority to pass out of the hands of the plotters and into those who would determine the next phase of Nigeria’s political life.
The Eastern Region and uneven execution
One of the most consequential features of the coup was what did not occur in the Eastern Region. Although the original concept included actions in Enugu and Benin, no comparable operation was executed there. No senior Eastern political leader was killed or abducted during the coup night.
This uneven execution became central to public interpretation. While the coup leaders spoke in national terms, the visible pattern of deaths and survivals shaped how Nigerians understood motive, balance, and consequence.
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What the country inherited
In the aftermath, Nigeria faced a transformed political landscape. Civilian leadership had been violently disrupted, regional power centres had experienced different levels of shock, and the military emerged as the final arbiter of national direction.
The coup ended the First Republic, but it also introduced a deeper legacy. Mistrust hardened, interpretations diverged, and the patterns established that night continued to influence Nigeria’s political trajectory long after the shooting stopped.
Author’s Note
January 15, 1966 was not a single, seamless takeover. It was a fragmented power grab that struck hardest in Kaduna and Ibadan, but failed to secure the one thing that turns force into government, stable federal command in Lagos. Its lasting impact came from uneven execution, the concentration of top level deaths in some regions, the absence of comparable action in others, and a regional broadcast attempting to fill a federal silence. Nigeria did not just enter military rule after that night, it entered an era shaped by suspicion, memory, and unresolved consequence.
References
Police Special Branch, Military Rebellion of 15 January 1966, investigative report compiled from interrogations.
Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Declaration of Martial Law, Radio Nigeria Kaduna, January 15, 1966.
Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck, The Story of the First Nigerian Coup, Evans Brothers, 1981.
Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture, 1966 to 1976, Routledge.
Nowamagbe Omoigui, compiled historical notes and hosted documentation on the January 1966 coup.
