Obasanjo’s letters to Gowon in 1969 provide a revealing account of the difficulties confronting the Nigerian Army during the final year of the Civil War. As commander of the Third Marine Commando Division, Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo reported serious operational problems and urged Head of State Major General Yakubu Gowon to reconsider aspects of the federal military campaign.
His correspondence addressed shortages of personnel, weapons and ammunition. It also questioned the pace of military operations, proposed changes in recruitment and procurement, and raised concerns about a planned humanitarian relief corridor.
The letters emerged during a difficult period for the federal military. Despite capturing substantial territory, Nigerian forces had encountered renewed Biafran resistance, particularly in the southern theatre of the war.
The correspondence offers an account of military decision-making, the responsibilities of field commanders and disagreements within the federal military establishment.
The Military Crisis of 1969
The Nigerian Civil War began on 6 July 1967, following the declaration of the independent Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967.
The federal military government, headed by Yakubu Gowon, sought to preserve Nigeria’s territorial unity. The Biafran leadership, headed by Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, sought to establish and defend an independent state.
By early 1969, the conflict had developed into a prolonged military and humanitarian crisis.
Federal troops had captured important towns and transport routes, but Biafran resistance continued. Civilians faced widespread displacement, food shortages and the consequences of military operations and restrictions on essential supplies.
One of the most significant federal military setbacks occurred at Owerri.
The town had been occupied by federal troops, but a prolonged siege by Biafran forces placed the federal garrison under severe pressure.
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In April 1969, the surviving troops of the federal garrison withdrew from Owerri, returning the town to Biafran control.
The withdrawal demonstrated that Biafran forces remained capable of conducting major military operations despite earlier territorial losses.
It also exposed serious difficulties within the federal Third Marine Commando Division, commanded by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle.
The loss of Owerri became an important development in the subsequent reorganisation of the federal military command.
Obasanjo Takes Command of the Third Marine Commando Division
On 12 May 1969, federal military authorities publicly announced that Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo would replace Colonel Benjamin Adekunle as commander of the Third Marine Commando Division.
The announcement formed part of a wider reorganisation of the federal army’s field command.
Colonel Iliya Bisalla was designated to replace Colonel Mohammed Shuwa in the First Division, while Colonel Gibson Jalo replaced Colonel Ibrahim Haruna in the Second Division.
Bisalla’s actual assumption of command was delayed until later in the year.
Obasanjo assumed command of the Third Marine Commando Division on 16 May 1969, arriving in Port Harcourt to take up his new responsibilities.
He inherited a formation facing substantial operational difficulties.
His immediate responsibilities included assessing the condition of the division’s personnel, equipment, discipline, supply arrangements and capacity to conduct further military operations.
The challenges confronting the formation soon became the subject of his correspondence with Gowon.
The Letter of 10 June 1969: A Commander Requests Urgent Support
Less than a month after taking command, Obasanjo sent Gowon a six-page letter dated 10 June 1969.
The correspondence described the condition of the Third Marine Commando Division following Obasanjo’s inspection of its operational areas.
He reported serious difficulties, including strained relationships among officers and shortages of military resources.
Nevertheless, he believed that the situation could improve if appropriate action was taken.
Obasanjo requested additional personnel, particularly individuals with medical and technical expertise.
He also sought improved access to weapons, ammunition and communications equipment.
His argument was that the division could not adequately fulfil its operational responsibilities without sufficient logistical support from the federal military authorities.
He urged Gowon to authorise additional mobilisation and military procurement, arguing that insufficient resources could prolong the fighting and increase its eventual cost.
The letter also addressed troop morale.
Obasanjo had encountered soldiers who were tired, poorly equipped and discouraged by their experiences at the front. His later account, My Command, described serious disciplinary problems within the formation, including desertion and cases of soldiers deliberately injuring themselves to obtain removal from the fighting.
However, his June correspondence indicated that he believed morale was improving and that the division’s willingness to fight remained intact.
The letter therefore combined an account of serious operational difficulties with an appeal for the resources Obasanjo considered necessary to sustain the formation’s recovery.
The Letter of 21 June 1969: A Dispute over Humanitarian Relief
Obasanjo’s correspondence also addressed the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Biafran-held territory.
On 21 June 1969, he wrote about a proposal to establish a surface relief corridor along the Cross River.
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The proposed route was part of international efforts to increase the delivery of food and medical supplies to civilians affected by the war.
Three days earlier, on 18 June, the United States Department of State had announced that the federal government and Biafran authorities had agreed in principle to establish a surface relief corridor.
The International Committee of the Red Cross was expected to manage the arrangement, although important operational details remained unresolved.
The proposed route was intended to supplement existing humanitarian airlifts, which could not meet the full scale of civilian relief requirements.
Obasanjo raised objections to implementing the proposed corridor through his operational area under the military conditions prevailing at the time.
He argued that he lacked sufficient personnel to guarantee the security of relief vessels travelling through the lower reaches of the Cross River.
He also raised concerns about the availability of experienced river pilots, the possibility of attacks on relief vessels and the danger that fighting near the proposed route could endanger humanitarian workers.
In the correspondence, he expressed support for providing humanitarian assistance but maintained that the proposed route was not practicable through his sector at that time.
His position reflected the security concerns of a military commander responsible for an area in which fighting continued.
The proposed corridor nevertheless remained an important subject of international diplomatic negotiations.
The United States continued advocating arrangements that would allow humanitarian supplies to reach civilians, including the resumption of relief flights and the implementation of the Cross River route.
The disagreement illustrated a wider problem confronting the parties to the conflict: the difficulty of reconciling military operations with the urgent need to deliver assistance to civilians.
The Letter of 17 July 1969: Obasanjo Proposes a Major Offensive
By July 1969, Obasanjo had become increasingly concerned about the pace of the federal military campaign.
In a letter dated 17 July, he argued that continuing the war under existing conditions risked prolonging the conflict.
He proposed a substantial expansion of the federal military effort.
His recommendations included additional recruitment, increased procurement of weapons and ammunition, and preparations for a concentrated offensive against Biafran-held territory.
Obasanjo also suggested stronger measures to prevent supplies from reaching Biafran forces by air.
He believed that the federal military required substantially greater manpower and equipment to achieve its operational objectives.
His proposal included considering limited conscription if voluntary recruitment could not provide sufficient personnel.
He also urged the authorities to obtain weapons and ammunition from available sources without compromising Nigeria’s sovereignty.
Obasanjo anticipated that a properly resourced campaign could bring the conflict to a military conclusion within a relatively short period after the necessary preparations had been completed.
The letter reflected his preference for a concentrated military effort rather than a prolonged campaign conducted with insufficient resources.
It also showed his growing concern that the existing approach could undermine troop morale and extend the conflict.
The Letter of 28 July 1969: Disagreement over the Government’s Response
Following discussions in Lagos about his earlier recommendations, Obasanjo wrote another letter to Gowon on 28 July 1969.
The correspondence referred to his preceding visit to Gowon and the Chief of Staff (Army), during which his proposals had been discussed.
Obasanjo expressed dissatisfaction with the response to his concerns.
He argued that the federal government needed to recognise the scale of the conflict and provide sufficient resources to achieve its stated military objectives.
One of his principal concerns was military expenditure.
Obasanjo questioned the reluctance to incur additional expenditure on weapons and equipment when, in his assessment, inadequate resources could prolong the fighting.
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He proposed exploring borrowing and other financing arrangements to obtain the military equipment he considered necessary.
His suggestions included raising funds domestically and considering financial arrangements involving Nigeria’s natural resources and commercial relationships.
Obasanjo maintained that the government needed to match its military objectives with the resources required to achieve them.
The correspondence also reflected disagreement within the federal military hierarchy.
As a divisional commander, Obasanjo was expected to report operational requirements to his superiors. His letters demonstrated that he was prepared to express dissatisfaction directly to Gowon when he believed the resources available to his division were inadequate.
Nevertheless, he continued to frame his arguments around his responsibilities as a federal military commander and the objectives of the government he served.
The correspondence was therefore an exchange over military strategy, operational priorities and resource allocation within the existing chain of command.
What Obasanjo’s Letters to Gowon Reveal About the Final Offensive
During the months that followed, the Third Marine Commando Division strengthened its preparations for further military operations.
Additional personnel and equipment became available to the formation, enabling it to undertake preparations for a major offensive.
Obasanjo also developed operational plans for the final phase of the campaign.
In December 1969, the division launched Operation Tail Wind, an offensive intended to link federal formations and advance into territory still held by Biafran forces.
The operation contributed to major federal advances during the closing weeks of the conflict.
Federal troops recaptured important positions, including Owerri, which returned to federal control in January 1970.
The offensive was part of a wider sequence of military developments involving other federal formations and the progressive contraction of Biafran-held territory.
The letters demonstrate that Obasanjo had advocated greater military mobilisation and a concentrated offensive before the final campaign.
His correspondence, subsequent operational preparations and the federal military advances formed part of the developments that preceded the war’s conclusion.
The End of the Nigerian Civil War
By January 1970, organised Biafran military resistance was collapsing.
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu left Biafran territory, and Philip Effiong assumed responsibility for the remaining Biafran leadership.
The military situation reached its final stage during the second week of January.
Obasanjo subsequently received Biafran representatives as part of the surrender process and facilitated their journey to Lagos for discussions with the federal authorities.
A contemporary United States diplomatic report dated 15 January 1970 recorded that a five-member Biafran peace delegation, including Philip Effiong and Louis Mbanefo, had arrived in Lagos on 14 January.
Following discussions with Gowon, Effiong issued a statement on 15 January accepting federal authority and declaring that the Republic of Biafra no longer existed.
Gowon responded with assurances concerning the treatment of people from the former Biafran territory.
On the same day, he announced the formal conclusion of the Nigerian Civil War.
The war had lasted approximately 30 months.
Its conclusion followed the collapse of organised Biafran military resistance, the surrender proceedings and the formal acceptance of federal authority.
Obasanjo’s Third Marine Commando Division had played an important role in the final military operations, alongside other federal formations and the wider military command.
Conclusion: The Historical Significance of the Correspondence
Obasanjo’s wartime letters provide an account of the challenges confronting the federal military during the final year of the Nigerian Civil War.
They document his concerns about manpower, weapons, ammunition, operational planning and the allocation of financial resources.
They also reveal disagreements over the proposed Cross River humanitarian relief corridor and the strategy for bringing the military campaign to a conclusion.
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The correspondence shows how a divisional commander communicated operational difficulties and proposed changes in military policy directly to the Head of State.
It also places Obasanjo’s command of the Third Marine Commando Division within the wider history of the conflict.
The final federal offensive and Biafra’s surrender involved numerous military formations, commanders and political decisions, as well as the actions of the remaining Biafran leadership.
The letters offer a valuable perspective on those events by recording the concerns and proposals of one of the commanders involved in the war’s final phase.
Author’s Note
Obasanjo’s correspondence with Gowon illustrates the difficulties of military leadership during a prolonged conflict, particularly when commanders must balance operational objectives, limited resources, troop welfare and the consequences of military decisions for civilians. The letters provide an important record of the pressures facing the federal military command in 1969, but they also belong to a wider history involving the experiences of Biafran forces, humanitarian organisations and the civilian population. Understanding the Nigerian Civil War requires examining these different perspectives together and recognising that its military and humanitarian consequences extended far beyond the decisions of any single commander.
References
Mojeed, Musikilu (2022). The Letterman: Inside the ‘Secret’ Letters of Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. Premium Times Books.
Obasanjo, Olusegun (1980). My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970. Heinemann Educational Books.
Omoigui, Nowa. Federal Nigerian Army Blunders of the Nigerian Civil War: Owerri, 1969, Part 8. Nigerian Civil War File.
United States Department of State (18 June 1969). Telegram 99708, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Document 79. Office of the Historian.
United States Department of State (15 July 1969). Telegram 116460, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Document 88. Office of the Historian.
United States Department of State (15 January 1970). Telegram 6676, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Document 163. Office of the Historian.
