Ogele, Mugbamugba and Kanla were three major attempts identified by Samuel Johnson to reverse the loss of Ilorin during the violent political upheavals that followed the weakening of the Oyo Empire. Their failure reveals why Ilorin became such a formidable power in northern Yorubaland and why the later confrontation at Osogbo assumed such importance.
The wars did not unfold as one simple contest between two fixed ethnic blocs. They emerged from the disintegration of an imperial political system in which provincial commanders, Muslim communities, ambitious chiefs, refugees and neighbouring powers competed for security and authority.
Ilorin had once occupied an important place in Oyo’s northern military structure. Afonja, the Are-Ona-Kakanfo based there, rebelled against Alaafin Awole during the crisis that engulfed the empire around the turn of the nineteenth century. After Afonja’s eventual death, Ilorin moved increasingly beyond the control of the Oyo monarchy and developed under a Muslim political order headed by Abd al-Salam.
Oyo’s leaders did not accept the transformation quietly. Several attempts followed to dislodge the new rulers of Ilorin. In Johnson’s account, Ogele was the first, Mugbamugba the second and Kanla the third.
Pamo, although an important battle in the same turbulent period, was not the third organised attempt to recover Ilorin.
The Collapse of Oyo Authority
The conflict over Ilorin formed part of the wider collapse of Old Oyo.
At its height, the Oyo Empire exercised authority across a vast area through the Alaafin, provincial officials, tribute networks and a military system that included powerful cavalry forces. By the early nineteenth century, however, the central government was struggling to control influential military commanders and provincial chiefs.
Afonja’s rebellion was one expression of that crisis.
After Afonja was killed, Ilorin did not return to obedience under the Alaafin. Instead, political power in the city shifted towards the Muslim leadership associated with Abd al-Salam and the communities that had participated in the struggles surrounding Afonja.
The resulting Ilorin state was socially and politically complex. Yoruba Muslims were deeply involved in its formation, while Fulani, Hausa and other groups were also present. The conflict cannot be understood simply as a war between “Yoruba” and “Fulani”, because alliances and rivalries crossed ethnic and political boundaries.
The remaining authorities associated with Oyo nevertheless regarded Ilorin’s separation as a major political and strategic loss.
Their first major attempt to reverse it ended at Ogele.
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Ogele: The First Attempt to Recover Ilorin
After Afonja’s death, Toyeje, the Baale of Ogbomoso, became Are-Ona-Kakanfo. As the empire’s senior military commander, he became central to attempts to confront the emerging Ilorin power.
Samuel Johnson identifies the campaign at Ogele as the first organised attempt to recover Ilorin.
Toyeje and his allies assembled forces and advanced towards the city. They camped at Ogele, where they encountered Ilorin forces that included formidable cavalry.
Solagberu, the influential Yoruba Muslim leader associated with Oke Suna near Ilorin, also played an important role in the political and military struggles of this period.
The anti-Ilorin coalition was defeated.
Ogele demonstrated that Ilorin could no longer be treated as a rebellious dependency that could simply be brought back under Oyo control by assembling a traditional coalition. The balance of power had changed.
The defeat also demonstrated the effectiveness of mounted warfare. Cavalry provided speed and manoeuvrability that could be devastating against infantry caught in suitable terrain.
Ilorin’s subsequent military pressure contributed to insecurity across neighbouring districts as settlements were abandoned, populations moved and the political geography of the old empire continued to fracture.
Mugbamugba: The Second Campaign
The second major recovery attempt became known as the Mugbamugba War.
This campaign brought another coalition against Ilorin and involved assistance from Monjia, associated with a Nupe ruler opposed to forces connected with Ilorin.
The campaign became famous not only for fighting but also for hunger.
Years of warfare had severely disrupted agriculture. Settlements had been attacked or abandoned, farmers had fled and cultivated land had declined in areas through which large armies moved.
When opposing forces gathered around Ilorin, available provisions were rapidly exhausted.
Soldiers were eventually forced to depend heavily on a fruit known as igba. Their dependence on this food contributed to the name Mugbamugba.
The episode illustrates one of the harsh realities of nineteenth-century warfare. An army could possess weapons and experienced commanders and still be crippled by inadequate supplies. Thousands of men concentrated in devastated countryside required enormous quantities of food.
An army unable to feed itself could not maintain a siege indefinitely.
Ilorin’s cavalry compounded the problem.
Mounted forces attacked the allied army from different directions. While part of the cavalry engaged from the front, another mounted body manoeuvred against the rear.
The coalition collapsed.
Its Nupe ally withdrew, and Ilorin emerged from the campaign with its position strengthened.
Mugbamugba showed that the contest was not determined by bravery alone. Mobility, provisions, geography, political cohesion and the capacity to sustain a prolonged campaign were equally important.
Pamo and the Politics of Division
Between the early recovery campaigns and the later Kanla expedition came further conflicts that exposed another serious weakness among Oyo’s successor forces: rivalry among their own commanders.
The Battle of Pamo is particularly important.
Pamo is sometimes placed alongside Ogele and Mugbamugba as though it were the third attempt to recover Ilorin. In Samuel Johnson’s sequence, however, that position belongs to Kanla.
The conflict at Pamo arose from rivalry between Toyeje, the Kakanfo based at Ogbomoso, and Adegun, the Onikoyi.
The dispute drew other powerful chiefs into opposing alliances. Toyeje was supported by forces that included leaders connected with Iwo and Ede, while Solagberu also became involved.
The opposing side eventually benefited from intervention connected with Abd al-Salam of Ilorin.
The result was another demonstration of how internal Yoruba political divisions could strengthen Ilorin’s position.
This was not an age in which every Yoruba commander automatically united against Ilorin. Chiefs pursued local interests, personal rivalries and competing claims to authority. Alliances could cross religious, political and regional boundaries.
Pamo matters because it exposes that complexity.
Ilorin did not expand solely because of cavalry superiority. Its opponents were repeatedly weakened by their inability to maintain a common political purpose.
Kanla: The Third Attempt to Expel Ilorin
The third attempt to expel the rulers of Ilorin was Kanla.
By this stage, Oyo’s political position had deteriorated considerably.
The Alaafin attempted to mobilise influential chiefs for another major campaign. Yet the monarchy no longer possessed the level of authority required to guarantee the obedience of powerful provincial commanders.
The political unity required for a successful Oyo-wide military campaign had substantially weakened. Rival chiefs possessed considerable autonomy, alliances shifted frequently and the Alaafin could no longer depend upon the military obedience that had characterised Oyo during its stronger imperial period.
The coalition nevertheless advanced and besieged Ilorin.
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Once again, it failed.
At Kanla the anti-Ilorin army suffered a severe defeat. Adegun, the Onikoyi who had previously figured prominently in the struggles among Oyo’s military chiefs, was killed.
The retreat became chaotic.
Some fugitives drowned while attempting to cross swollen waterways during the retreat.
Kanla therefore represented more than another lost battle. It illustrated how difficult it had become to reconstruct the political and military unity of imperial Oyo.
The three major recovery attempts had now produced three failures.
Why Ilorin Was So Difficult to Defeat
Cavalry was one major reason for Ilorin’s battlefield effectiveness, particularly where terrain allowed mounted troops to manoeuvre freely.
But cavalry does not explain the entire story.
The opponents of Ilorin also faced a crisis of leadership.
Oyo had once possessed institutions capable of directing military resources across a broad political system. As central authority weakened, military initiative increasingly passed to powerful regional chiefs and emerging towns.
Coalitions became less reliable.
Personal disputes could turn former allies against one another. Local interests could override wider political objectives. Communities struggling to survive repeated warfare were not always willing or able to contribute men, food and resources to distant campaigns.
Supply was another crucial factor.
Mugbamugba showed how the destruction of farms and settlements could cripple military operations. The ability to mobilise soldiers meant little if an army could not feed them during a prolonged expedition.
Ilorin benefited from this combination of military strength and political weakness among its opponents.
Its survival further accelerated the transformation of the former Oyo political world.
The Road to Osogbo
The eventual confrontation at Osogbo occurred only after years of warfare had demonstrated how dangerous Ilorin forces could be.
The Battle of Osogbo is commonly placed in the late 1830s or around 1840. Robin Law’s chronology places it around 1838.
By this period, Ibadan had emerged as a major military centre in the fragmented world created by Oyo’s collapse.
Its commanders confronted the same serious battlefield problem faced by earlier armies: Ilorin cavalry.
The Ibadan forces were cautious about offering battle in open country where mounted troops could exploit their mobility. They remained close to terrain that provided greater protection and avoided conditions that would favour a conventional daylight cavalry engagement.
Their eventual attack came after sunset.
The force moved towards the Ilorin camp under cover of darkness and launched its major assault around midnight.
Surprise transformed the conditions of battle.
Horsemen who were exceptionally dangerous when organised and manoeuvring across open terrain had much less opportunity to exploit those advantages when their camp was suddenly attacked in darkness.
The Ilorin army was defeated and its southward military advance was checked.
The Ibadan victory did not restore Ilorin to Oyo control, but it marked a major change in the military balance.
A War More Complex Than Yoruba Against Fulani
The conflicts surrounding Ilorin are sometimes presented as a straightforward ethnic struggle between Yoruba armies and Fulani forces.
The political landscape was considerably more complicated.
Yoruba Muslims participated in Ilorin’s rise. Yoruba chiefs sometimes fought other Yoruba chiefs. Nupe rulers appeared in changing alliances. Religious identity, local security, personal ambition and political authority all influenced the decisions of commanders and communities.
Ilorin itself developed through the interaction of different populations rather than as an ethnically uniform military community.
The same complexity shaped the wars fought against it.
Neither Oyo’s decline nor Ilorin’s rise can be explained by a single battle, individual or ethnic rivalry.
They were part of a broader transformation of political authority across nineteenth-century Yorubaland.
Conclusion
Ogele, Mugbamugba and Kanla were not merely three forgotten defeats before a more famous victory.
They were stages in the transformation of nineteenth-century Yorubaland.
Ogele showed that Ilorin could no longer easily be restored to Oyo control. Mugbamugba exposed the devastating interaction between cavalry warfare and logistical collapse. Pamo demonstrated how rivalry among Yoruba chiefs could open opportunities for Ilorin intervention. Kanla confirmed the inability of the weakened Oyo political centre to recreate the unity necessary for a decisive recovery campaign.
Osogbo later represented a different military moment.
Ibadan had emerged from the ruins of the older order as an important military power capable of organising its own armies and responding to the realities of warfare in the region.
The victory at Osogbo did not restore the old Oyo Empire or return Ilorin to its former political position.
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It did, however, check Ilorin’s southward military pressure and demonstrate that the cavalry strength which had contributed to earlier victories could be overcome under different battlefield conditions.
Understanding Osogbo therefore requires understanding what came before it.
The road to that battle ran through Ogele, Mugbamugba, Pamo and Kanla, through failed coalitions, devastated farms, political rivalries and an imperial system breaking into new centres of power.
Author’s Note
The history of Ogele, Mugbamugba and Kanla shows that the collapse of a great political system rarely occurs in a single decisive moment. Oyo’s decline unfolded through rebellion, weakened central authority, competing commanders, disrupted agriculture, changing alliances and repeated military setbacks. Ilorin’s rise was equally complex, shaped by cavalry strength, Muslim political organisation and the divisions of its opponents. Pamo belongs within this wider story, but Kanla was the third of the major recovery attempts described by Samuel Johnson. By the time Ibadan confronted Ilorin at Osogbo, years of warfare had transformed the political landscape and created new centres of military power. Osogbo mattered because it emerged from that long process of upheaval.
References
Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate, edited by Obadiah Johnson, London: George Routledge & Sons, 1921.
Robin Law, “The Chronology of the Yoruba Wars of the Early Nineteenth Century: A Reconsideration”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1970.
Aribidesi Usman and Toyin Falola, The Yoruba from Prehistory to the Present, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
