The military coup of 15 January 1966 is often described as the moment Nigeria’s army entered politics. This interpretation is misleading. Evidence from Nigeria’s colonial inheritance, early post‑independence governance, and the crises of the First Republic shows that the army had already been drawn into political processes before it seized power. The coup was not a sudden aberration but the outcome of a gradual erosion of professional civil military boundaries.
Colonial Origins and the Political Role of Force
The Nigerian Army evolved directly from colonial security forces created to enforce imperial authority rather than to defend a democratic state. These forces were routinely deployed to suppress internal dissent, labour unrest, and anti‑colonial resistance. Their function was political by design: to maintain order as defined by the colonial administration. At independence in 1960, this force was inherited largely intact. Its training, command culture, and internal discipline reflected colonial priorities, not democratic accountability.
No comprehensive effort was made to redefine the army’s role in a sovereign constitutional system. Civilian supremacy was assumed rather than institutionally entrenched. This left the military with significant autonomy and an unclear understanding of its limits in domestic political crises.
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Recruitment, Promotion, and Regional Perceptions
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the composition of the officer corps had become politically sensitive. Recruitment patterns, educational access, and promotion pipelines differed markedly across regions. While these imbalances were not always deliberate, they became politicised in public debate and elite competition.
As Nigeria’s federal politics hardened along regional lines, the army was increasingly perceived as part of this rivalry. Officers themselves were exposed to these narratives through the press, political patronage networks, and informal discussion. This environment made it difficult to sustain the idea of the army as a neutral national institution detached from regional interests.
Civilian Crisis and the Use of the Military
Politicisation was accelerated by the behaviour of civilian leaders. The First Republic experienced repeated constitutional breakdowns, most notably in the Western Region crisis of 1962 and the federal election of 1964. Political disputes were frequently resolved through emergency powers, security deployments, and coercion rather than consensus or judicial legitimacy.
The army was deployed to restore order during periods of electoral violence and political paralysis. These interventions were formally authorised, but they normalised the military’s presence in political conflict. Soldiers observed at close range the manipulation of institutions, the subversion of due process, and the inability of civilian authorities to maintain legitimacy.
Exposure to Corruption and State Failure
By 1965, widespread electoral fraud and violence, particularly in the Western Region, had severely undermined confidence in civilian rule. Soldiers deployed on internal security duties witnessed intimidation, arson, and killings linked to political competition. This exposure fostered the belief among some officers that the political class was incapable of governing responsibly.
Such perceptions are historically significant. Comparative studies of military intervention show that coups are most likely when officers conclude that civilian leaders have lost moral and functional authority. In Nigeria, this conclusion was reached by segments of the officer corps before January 1966.
Political Consciousness Within the Officer Corps
The Nigerian officer corps of the early 1960s was small, educated, and socially aware. Many officers had received training abroad and were influenced by debates about nationalism, development, and military modernisation in other post‑colonial states. Political discussion within the barracks was common, even if it was informal and fragmented.
This did not amount to a unified military ideology or a collective plan to seize power. However, it did mean that officers were actively evaluating the legitimacy of civilian rule. Once the military begins to assess political authority rather than merely obey it, professional neutrality has already been compromised.
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Weak Civilian Oversight
Civilian control of the military was institutionally weak. Parliamentary oversight of defence matters was minimal. The constitutional role of the armed forces in internal security was poorly defined. Senior politicians often feared the army but lacked coherent strategies for managing it.
This neglect allowed grievances and political interpretations to develop unchecked within the ranks. When junior officers eventually acted in January 1966, they did so in an environment where military intervention had become conceivable, even if not inevitable
The Nigerian Army was already politicised before the coup of 15 January 1966. Colonial legacies, regionalised politics, civilian misuse of coercive power, and weak institutional oversight combined to erode the boundary between military professionalism and political action. The coup was not the origin of this process but its most dramatic manifestation.
Author’s Note
This article argues that Nigeria’s first military coup should be understood as the outcome of structural and political failures within the First Republic rather than as an isolated conspiracy by rogue officers. Recognising this context is essential for an accurate understanding of Nigeria’s civil–military history.
References
Luckham, R. The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960–67. Cambridge University Press.
Siollun, M. Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture 1966–1976. Algora Publishing.
Diamond, L. Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria. Syracuse University Press.
