On 15 January 1966, Nigeria experienced its first military coup, ending the First Republic and reshaping the nation’s political landscape. This dramatic event was driven not just by political grievances but by control of the Army’s operational forces. Understanding who commanded the troops and how power flowed within the Army provides clarity on why the coup unfolded as it did and how the military subsequently took over governance.
The Nigerian Army Structure in 1966
At the time, the Nigerian Army was organised hierarchically. At the top was the General Officer Commanding (GOC), who oversaw the entire Army, its formations, discipline, and strategic direction. Beneath the GOC were brigades and battalions, which had direct control of soldiers, weapons, and operational movements. Staff officers at Army Headquarters coordinated logistics, planning, and intelligence but did not command troops unless assigned.
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Contrary to popular belief, the Army was not formally regionalised. While units were stationed across Nigeria, operational power depended on direct troop command, not rank alone or regional identity.
Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi: Senior Authority, Not Coup Leader
Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi was the General Officer Commanding. He held the highest position in the Army, but historical records confirm he did not plan or direct the coup. When the mutiny erupted, Ironsi acted to restore order in Lagos and other critical locations.
Following the collapse of the civilian government and the deaths of several senior political and military leaders, Ironsi was recognised as Head of State. His authority derived from seniority and acceptance by remaining officers, not from participation in the coup itself.
The Coup Plotters and Operational Control
The January 1966 coup was executed by a group of junior officers, mostly Majors, who had direct command over specific units. Their operational control allowed them to mobilise troops effectively and target key locations.
Key figures included:
- Major Kaduna Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who led operations in Kaduna.
- Major Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna, active in Lagos.
- Major Chris Anuforo, involved at Army Headquarters in Lagos.
- Major Donatus Okafor, commander of the Federal Guards Brigade.
- Major Adewale Ademoyega and Major Humphrey Chukwuka, among others.
These officers directed units to seize strategic points such as military installations, police headquarters, government offices, and communication hubs. Their authority over troops on the ground was the decisive factor in the coup’s initial success.
Events of 15 January 1966
In the early hours, coup forces moved swiftly:
- Kaduna: Nzeogwu’s detachment secured strategic points and eliminated senior officers.
- Lagos: Ifeajuna and Anuforo mobilised troops to key installations; loyal units resisted, limiting the coup’s success.
- Ibadan and other cities: Operations occurred with varying degrees of effectiveness.
The coup led to the assassination of several senior political leaders, including Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Premier of Northern Region Sir Ahmadu Bello, and Premier of Western Region Samuel Akintola, among others.
Despite their initial gains, the coup plotters did not achieve total control. Resistance from loyalist Army units and incomplete coordination outside Lagos prevented full nationwide dominance.
Aftermath and Consolidation
Following the initial events, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi and loyal officers worked to restore order. Mutineers were contained in areas where the Army maintained effective command. Ironsi, being the most senior officer not implicated in the coup, became Nigeria’s Head of State, consolidating power and preventing further chaos.
The January coup was a pivotal moment in Nigeria’s history, demonstrating that control of troops on the ground can determine the outcome of political upheaval, even when senior officers maintain formal authority.
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Author’s Note
This account shows that during the January 1966 coup, operational control rested with a small group of junior officers who commanded troops and weapons. Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi did not plan the coup but became Head of State due to seniority and acceptance by remaining officers. The event underscores how the Army’s hierarchy allowed those with direct troop authority to influence national outcomes, while formal rank did not guarantee operational control. Readers should understand the coup not as a single moment of violence, but as a complex interplay of authority, control, and swift military action that changed Nigeria’s political trajectory forever.
References
- Max Siollun – Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966–1976)
- Adewale Ademoyega – Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup
- Alexander Madiebo – The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
- Olusegun Oyeweso – The 1966 Coups and the Nigerian Civil War (Academic Paper)
